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ARGUMENT
I:

THE FACTS ACKNOWLEDGED BY BOTH PARTIES
ESTABLISH THERE WERE NO SIMULTANEOUS CUSTODY
PROCEEDINGS IN MEXICO WHEN MOTHER FILED HER
PETITION IN UTAH.

A.

The Trial Court Failed to Identify the Factual and Legal Assumptions
which Support its Dismissal of the Petition.

The lower court failed to cite any basis upon which it discarded, almost in their
entirety, the allegations contained in the petition establishing that the mother and the parties'
children had resided in Utah since December 2010 (thereby establishing home-state status),
that there were no simultaneous custody proceedings in Mexico and accordingly, jurisdiction
was appropriately cast in Utah under the provisions of the Utah Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Enforcement Act, Utah Code § 78B- l 3- l O1 et seq. (hereinafter UUCCJEA). (R.
1-58-Petition filed 11/18/13; R. 377, 853--Order of Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction dated
12/5/14; R. 916, 931--Order Overruling Petitioner's Objection to Commissioner's
Recommendation dated 3/17/15; R. 1238-- Ruling and Order on Petitioner's Motion to
Amend Order dated 4/30/15).
Contrary to the unsupported contention of father in his brief, the lower court did not
"take judicial notice, admit[] into the record or rely[] upon the findings, conclusions, and
orders of various custody and other relevant proceedings in which the parties had previously
engaged" (Appellee's Brief, p. 7, fn. 1). Aside from a singular statement that the "federal
court's ruling [was] valid except to the extent that it implies this Court has jurisdiction to
conduct child custody proceedings," the lower court made no findings as to the specific
proceedings in Mexico it concluded were in existence at the time the petition was filed. Id.

Instead of citing the specific orders in the Mexico courts on which it relied to
conclude that there were simultaneous custody proceedings in Mexico, the lower court made
non-specific and generalized statements regarding the subject. Commissioner Patton, in his
recommendation, stated:
The Court finds that Mexico had jurisdiction in October 2007
when child custody proceedings were initiated in the 36 th Court
of Family Matters in the Federal District of Mexico in case
number 1427/2007 and the subsequent bifurcation in the 24 th
Court of Family Matters in the Federal District of Mexico in
case number 1529/2010 further confirmed that jurisdiction and
reserved the parties custodial rights as subject to further
litigation therein in November 2010.
R. 853, 855.
Judge Johnson's March 17, 2015 Order upheld the recommendation of the
Commissioner that Utah did not have jurisdiction to hear the case under the provisions of the
UUCCJEA because there were
. . . both civil and criminal proceedings pending in Mexico
wherein the parties' minor children and the parties' parental
rights remain at issue. This indicates to the Court that Mexico
has not abandoned or otherwise continues to exercise
jurisdiction over issues of child custody....
R. 931.

The rulings and orders of the lower court did not refute mother's allegation that
mother and the children had resided in Utah since December 2010 and that Utah was the
home state of the minor children under the provisions of the UUCCJEA. Id.
With the home state issue resolved, the jurisdictional issue comes down to whether
there was undisputed evidence of the existence of simultaneous custody proceedings in
2

Mexico when the Utah petition was filed. Instead of there being undisputed evidence of
simultaneous proceedings in Mexico, however, the undisputed evidence establishes the
absence of custody proceedings in Mexico when the petition was filed in Utah.

B.

Father's Brief Establishes There Were no Simultaneous Custody
Proceedings in Mexico.

The parties agree there were two divorce-custody related proceedings filed in Mexico
before the petition was filed in this case. The issue becomes one of assessing whether there
are custody related orders emanating from those proceedings that are still in effect and
whether the actions or proceedings in Mexico were still open, thus constituting a
simultaneous proceeding.
1.

Main Mexico Divorce/Custody Action.

The parties agree that Father filed for divorce against Mother in Mexico City in early
October 2007. The action was filed in the Superior Court for the Federal District, Domestic
Affairs, Thirty-Six Court,File No. 1472/2007. That case produced multiple orders relating
to the custody of the children including the orders of 10/17/2007, 12/11/2007, 6/30/2010
(Appellant's opening brief, Statement of Facts,

,r,r

4-6, 10-16, Addendum A at 4-6;

Appellee's Brief, at 7-14).
In the June 30, 2010 order, the court in Mexico entered a final custody order granting
Mother sole custody or "custodia definitiva." Id. See also, Rec. 86, 88-89. In August 2010,
both Mother and Father appealed the June 30, 2010 order entered in the divorce action.
While the original divorce/custody case was on appeal, Father filed a no-fault divorce case.
Because the original divorce/custody case had adjudicated or was in the process ofresolving
3

all the other issues attendant to a divorce, Father sought only a decree of divorce in the nofault proceedings. A decree of divorce was entered in that no-fault separate action on
November 25, 2010. Rec. 1-7, Appellant's original brief, Addendum F; Appellees' brief at
10.
Both parties acknowledge that when the judge in the original divorce/custody action
learned of the filing of the separate action for divorce under the newly adopted no-fault law,
he entered the order of February 8, 2013. Appellant's Opening Brief, Addendum A, E;
Appellee's Brief atp. 14. In that February 8, 2013 order, the court in the original divorce case
rescinded and nullified all the previously entered custody orders in the case and dismissed
the action with finality. Appellant's original brief at 8-9, 26-29, Addendum E; Appellee's
Brief at 14.
Accordingly, after February 8, 2013, there were no enforceable court orders regarding
custody and visitation in Mexico and there was no underlying action relating to custody or
visitation. Id.

Father's brief acknowledges that the February 8, 2013 order not only

terminated the main divorce case but acted to rescind all orders previously issued by that
court. Appellee's Brief at 14.
Accordingly, on November 18, 2013, when the petition was filed in this case, the
main divorce action in Mexico had been dismissed and prior orders rescinded and vacated.
Accordingly, there was no basis upon which the lower court in this case could have
concluded that the main divorce action in Mexico constituted a simultaneous proceeding or
that active enforceable orders from that action existed.

4

Although Father has implied throughout this litigation that the original
divorce/custody action was a "simultaneous proceeding" under the UUCCJEA, his brief on
appeal establishes clearly that he now concedes that the original divorce/custody action was
dismissed and all orders therefrom recanted and nullified. Id.
2.

No Fault Proceeding in Mexico.

As discussed above, while the original divorce/custody case in Mexico was on appeal,
Father, trying to take advantage of newly enacted no-fault provisions in Mexico, filed a
separate action for divorce in another court in Mexico and sought to obtain only a decree of
divorce, reserving all other issues of property settlement, custody, visitation and support to
be resolved by the court hearing the main divorce action. On November 25, 2010, the court
signed a decree of divorce under the no-fault law and explicitly refused to deal with other
issues in the divorce including custody of the children. Appellant's opening brief, Statement
of Facts, ,r,r 4-6, 10-16; Addendum A at 4-6; Addendum F; Rec. 1-7.
This separate action was filed by father only to get a no-fault divorce. No other issues
relating to the divorce, including custody, were included because both parties knew that all
such issues were presented in the original divorce/custody case. Father cites to and quotes
from the decree entered in the action. Appellee's brief at 10. However, father's excerpts
from the order are incomplete. In order to prevent any confusion, an English version of the
order entered on November 25,2010 is attached hereto as Addendum, Exhibit A, R. 595-600.
It should be noted that none of the orders from Mexico were admitted as evidence in
the district court or otherwise authenticated under rules 901 and 902 of the Utah Rules of

5

Evidence. Further, the only motion requesting the court to take judicial notice was filed by
Mother and related to the new action filed by father in Mexico 128 days after the petition was
filed in this case (Appellant's opening brief, Statement of Facts No. 15; R. 895-897, 898913).
A simple reading of the order in the no-fault case reveals that the court conducted a
hearing at 11:30 a.m. on November 25, 2010. Id. The court proceeded to allow for the
"authentication of the spouses" (R. 595). After the parties were authenticated, both mother
and father "took the floor to declare irreconcilable differences .... "Id. The order then
provides:
. . . given the legal situation of their minor children named
S_ _ and R_ _, both with the last name Matas Libbey, is
under judgment in the Thirty-Six Family Court of this City, for
which reason they request that the present petition for divorce be
continued....

Id.
The only reasonable interpretation of the language in the order is that the court
proceeded to allow the parties to put on evidence necessary to grant a divorce based upon
irreconcilable differences, but deferred all other issues including those related to the minor
children, to the court in the main divorce case described above. At the time the no-fault court
entered its order, 11/25/2010, the main divorce case was active and proceeding.
With that background, the portion of the order recited by the father makes perfect
sense. Appellee's brief at 10:
the matrimonial bonds between [father] and [mother] are hereby
dissolved. . . With regard to the settlement proposal and
6

counterproposal exhibited by the parties, their rights are
safeguarded so that, if necessary, they may be upheld in the
corresponding incidence. (emphasis added).

Id.
The case to which the no-fault court was referring could only be the main divorce case
described above because there were no other actions pending. It was to that main action, that
the court in the no-fault order earlier referred. There can be no serious dispute as to the
interpretation of the no-fault order. The court identified the main divorce case in the early
part of the order and further recognized that because the court handling that case had
undertaken the resolution of the issues attendant to a divorce, including those relevant to the
minor children, the no-fault court was not going to take evidence or attempt to resolve those
custody issues in that action. The no-fault court, in the excerpt set out above, restates the
holding that the rights of the parties are at issue in the "corresponding incidence" (main
divorce action) and could be pursued in the no-fault action.
There is nothing in the no-fault order that preserved jurisdiction in that case to hear
custody or property issues at a later date. The court issuing the no-fault decree clearly
identified the main divorce case as the case handling the other issues (including custody) and
deferred their resolution to that court.
Accordingly, the court in the no-fault case never undertook to adjudicate custody and
visitation and did not preserve any right to do so. Rather the court simply deferred to the
court adjudicating the main divorce case. Therefore, when the main divorce case was
dismissed on February 8, 2013, there was no other action pending that could have inherited
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the task of adjudicating the ancillary divorce issues. Thus, after February 8, 2013, there was
no pending action in Mexico between these parties adjudicating custody and visitation.
Certainly, at the time the petition was filed on November 18, 2013, neither action in Mexico
was active or the source of any enforceable orders relating to custody of the minor children.
3.

New Action Filed by Father After the Utah Petition was Filed.

If either of the two actions in Mexico were still on-going or available forums to
litigate custody and visitation, Father certainly would have resorted to those forums to obtain
relief on his custody-visitation requests after the February 8, 2013 order dismissing the main
divorce case. Instead, after the February 8, 2013 order and after the filing of the petition in
this case on November 18, 2013, Father filed a new action in Mexico on March 27, 2014
(128 days after the filing of the Utah petition). Appellant's opening brief, Statement of Facts,

,r 15.
Father would not have filed a new action post-petition if he could have resurrected
either the original divorce or the no-fault ancillary proceeding. Father, in his brief, fails to
give any explanation for the incongruity of his argument. Appellee's brief at 20.
Both Commissioner Patton and Judge Johnson, in their respective orders, referred to
the two actions in Mexico as pending and on-going and actively asserting jurisdiction over
the custody and visitation issue between the parties. The existence of the cases and alleged
orders issued in those forums was the basis of the court's findings that Utah did not have
jurisdiction. The fact that the main divorce case in Mexico had been dismissed and neither
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case was active or on-going undercuts the factual and legal premise of the trial court's ruling,
and the orders should be reversed and the matter remanded.

II:

THE PROVISIONS OF THE UUCCJEA ESTABLISH UTAH'S
JURISDICTION IN THIS CASE.

The UUCCJEA gives priority to the child's home state in determining whether a state
has subject matter jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination. See Utah Code
§ 78B-13-201(1). The state that "is the home state of the child on the date of the
commencement of the proceeding, or was the home state of the child within six months
before the commencement" has subject matter jurisdiction over the child custody proceeding.
Utah Code§ 78B-13-102(7), Utah Code§ 78B-13-201(1)(a). See also Meyeres v. Meyeres,
2008 UT App 364, 196 P.3d 604.
Father does not refute the proposition that as long as Utah is the home state of the
minor children at the time the petition is filed, no other state or country's court will have
subject matter jurisdiction to make an initial custody determination. 1 Appellee' s brief at 2831.

The undisputed facts in this case establish that the mother and the children resided in

the same location in Utah County, Utah from December 2010 to the present. Additionally,

1

See Utah Code§ 78B-13-201(1)(b)-(d); see also Arjona v. Torres, 941 So. 2d 451,
455 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); In re Brown, 203 S.W.3d 888, 891 (Tex. App. 2006)
("[H]ome-state jurisdiction trumps all other possible bases of jurisdiction in an initial child
custody action .... "); Hatch v. Hatch (In re Ka/bes), 2007 WI App 136, ,r 12, 302 Wis. 2d
215, 733 N.W.2d 648 ("Under the Uniform Act, home state jurisdiction always receives
priority, and other jurisdictional bases are available only when there is no home state, or
where the home state declines jurisdiction.").
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as argued in Point I above, there were no simultaneous custody proceeding in Mexico at the
time the petition was filed in this case. Utah Code§ 78B-13-206.
Father, unable to dispute Utah's home-state jurisdiction under the UCCJEA, presents
a flawed argument that is founded on an non-existent factual predicate. Father argues that
mother has improperly relied upon the "initial child custody jurisdiction" provisions of the
UCCJEA because Mexico already made "the relevant initial child custody determination"
prior to the filing of the petition and Mexico retains exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over
the matter. Appellee' s brief at 28-31.
Father's argument does not identify the court in Mexico or the order issued therefrom
that he maintains is the"initial child custody determination." Id. Because the court in Mexico
that entered the no-fault divorce decree did not adjudicate any issues related to custody and
visitation, the only possible action in Mexico that father could be referencing is the main
divorce action. However, mother has demonstrated in Point I above that although that court
entered numerous interim orders related to custody and jurisdiction, all those determinations
and interim orders were vacated, nullified and rescinded by the order of February 8, 2013,
which also dismissed the case. Appellant's original brief at 8-9, 26-29, Addendum E thereto.
Father's argument is inconsistent with his own factual recitation. Father concedes that
"on February 8, 2013, the 36 th Family Court revoked the prior temporary custody orders ..
. . " Appellee's brief at 14. The law is clear that an order that is rescinded, revoked or
nullified has no ongoing legal effect. See Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b ); Slay v. Nationstar Mortgage,
L.L.C., 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 1365, 2010 WL 670095 (Tex. App. Fort Worth Feb. 25,
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2010) ("[a] judgment that has been vacated has no legal effect" and "the matter stands
precisely as if there had been no judgment."). Accordingly all orders entered in the main
divorce action in Mexico were nullified on February 8, 2013 and had no ongoing legal effect.
Additionally, although a rescinded or nullified order leaves the parties in the position
they were in prior to the entry of the order, the underlying divorce action was also dismissed
by the February 8, 2013 order.

Therefore, there was no forum to exercise on-going

jurisdiction.
Utah Code§ 78B-13-102(3) defines a "child custody determination" as a judgment,
decree, or other order of a court providing for the legal custody, physical custody, or
parent-time with respect to a child. There is no question that the statute includes, within the
term, "permanent, temporary, initial, and modification order[s]." Id. However, the facts of
this case establish that there was no initial child custody determination in Mexico because
all orders relating to custody were rescinded and nullified.
Additionally, because there was no initial child custody determination in Mexico
because all orders were vacated and the underlying action dismissed, Mexico could not retain
continuing jurisdiction over that determination as provided in the UCCJEA. Utah Code §
78B-13-202(1)(a)-(b), Appellee's brief at 28-30.

III:

INCHOATE PARENTAL RIGHTS DO NOT PROVIDE AN
ALTERNATE BASIS UPON WHICH MEXICO CAN ASSERT
JURISDICTION.

Mother has established in Points I and II above that Utah has jurisdiction to adjudicate
the petition filed in this case based upon home-state status, the lack of any enforceable order
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of custody from a court in Mexico, and the absence of any on-going proceedings in Mexico
that could be characterized as a "simultaneous proceeding." Utah Code § 78B-13-206.
Father contends in response that his inherent or natural parental rights, as recognized by the
law in Mexico, constitute an initial custody determination, an on-going order of custody and
a manifestation of Mexico's continuing exercise of jurisdiction in this case. Appellee's brief
at31-38.
Before treating the legal argument, it is important to examine the factual assertions
upon which father bases his analysis. Repeatedly, father argues that the orders entered in the
main divorce case in Mexico between 2007, when the case was filed, to February 8, 2013,
constitute a "child custody determination" as defined by Utah Code § 78B-13-102(3).
Further, father argues that because the courts in Mexico asserted jurisdiction in the main
divorce action during the same period of time, Mexico has an on-going claim to exclusive
jurisdiction in the matter. Id. Father relies on references to the preservation of general or
inherent parental rights by the courts as some kind of custody determination and on-going
order and proceeding. Id. at 33-35.
The record is clear, however, that there was no court in Mexico that was asserting
jurisdiction over the minor children of the parties when the petition in this case was filed.
When the petition was filed in Utah, there was no open court case in Mexico to which an
application could have been made by either party to assert jurisdiction over the custody of
the children. Every order affecting the custody of the minor children originating in Mexico
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was rescinded and vacated on February 8, 2013 and accordingly, there was no enforceable
court order in place when mother filed her petition in the Utah courts.
The remaining legal issue is whether inchoate or natural parental rights as recognized
in Mexico constitute a child custody proceeding or child custody determination as defined
by the UCCJEA. The resolution of the issue is resolved by the wording of the statute itself.
If a party to a custody action contends that there is a competing jurisdiction who has a
superior right to jurisdiction because of a simultaneous proceeding, the statute provides the
means that should be employed to resolve the matter.
Utah Code§ 78B-13-206(1) provides that "a court of this state may not exercise its
jurisdiction under this chapter if at the time of the commencement of the proceeding a
proceeding concerning the custody of the child had been previously commenced in a court
of another state having jurisdiction substantially in conformity with this chapter, unless the
proceeding has been terminated .... "
Mother has previously cited this Court to the holding inMeyeres v. Meyeres, 2008 UT
App 364, 196 P.3d 604, in conjunction with the issue of whether the criminal action against
mother could be considered a simultaneous custody action. Appellant's opening brief at 4041. The holding in Meyeres is likewise dispositive of the issue father now raises.
In Meyeres, this Court stated that the courts of Utah are not bound by the
determination of another jurisdiction as to whether Utah does or does not have jurisdiction.
A Utah court faced with the question of whether a simultaneous action exists must make the
decision for itself as to whether another state's court has jurisdiction. Id. ,-i 6, citing Utah
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Code § 78B-13-206(2). Simply, a claim by a court of another state of jurisdiction is not
binding on a Utah court. Id.
This Court then cited cases where the challenging state did not have home state
jurisdiction and therefore did not acquire jurisdiction in accordance with the UUCCJEA. Id.
See Welch-Doden v. Roberts, 202 Ariz. 201, 42 P.3d 1166, 1176 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002);
Arjona v. Torres, 941 So. 2d451, 455 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006;In re Burk, 252 S.W.3d 736,
741 (Tex. App. 2008); Hatch v. Hatch (In re Ka/bes), 2007 WI App 136, 733 N.W.2d 648
("[T]he Idaho court did not have jurisdiction to make an initial determination of [the child's]
custody because [the child's] 'home state' was Wisconsin. The Idaho court therefore did not
have jurisdiction 'substantially in conformity with [the UCCJEA], ' and the Wisconsin court
was not prohibited from exercising jurisdiction under [the simultaneous proceeding statute]."
(footnote omitted)).
Importantly, the courtinNBv. GA, 133 Haw. 436,329 P.3d341 (Haw. Ct. App. 2014)
noted that the comment to section 206 of the Uniform Act provides that "[u ]nder this Act,
the simultaneous proceedings problem will arise only when there is no home State, no State
with exclusive, continuing jurisdiction and more than one significant connection State." Id.
at 442, 329 P.3d at 347.
As applied to the facts of this case, a claim by a court in Mexico on November 18,
2013, when the petition was filed, that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate the custody of the
parties' minor children, could not be made based upon home-state status, the existence of an
actual pending court case in Mexico or the existence of an enforceable court order out of a
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Mexico. Instead the claim of jurisdiction would have to be based upon some notion of
natural or inchoate parental rights. Natural or inherent parental rights is not a basis of
creating jurisdiction recognized under the UCCJEA. Utah Code§ 78B-13-206(1).
Because inherent or natural parental rights are not a recognized basis for competing
jurisdictional rights under the UCCJEA, father's argument that Mexico has jurisdiction based
upon inchoate parental rights must be rejected.

IV:

THE CRIMINAL ACTION WAS NOT A"SIMULTANEOUS
PROCEEDING" REQUIRING UTAH COURTS TO DEFER
JURISDICTION.

The trial court held that because the termination of mother's parental rights could
conceivably be part of the sanction imposed if she was convicted of wrongfully taking the
parties' children out of Mexico, the criminal proceeding constituted a "child custody
proceeding" under the UCCJEA. U.C.A. 78B-13-102(4). R. 377, 853--Order of Dismissal
for Lack of Jurisdiction dated 12/5/14.
Mother, in her opening brief, argued that contrary to the lower court's findings, the
criminal case brought against her in Mexico is not a "simultaneous proceedings" under the
UUCCJEA that can be used as a basis for Utah to defer jurisdiction. The basis of mother's
argument is similar to that made in Point III above. Because the court in the criminal case
did not acquire " ... [] jurisdiction substantially in conformity with the [jurisdictional
requirements of the UUCCJEA]," it is not a simultaneous proceedings that requires Utah to
defer jurisdiction. Utah Code § 78B-13-206 (2008); Appellant's opening brief at 37-41,
Statement of Facts, ,r,r 32-33.
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Father's responsive brief fails to engage Mother's argument and analysis. Father does
not argue that the court in the criminal case acquired jurisdiction over mother based upon
analysis of home-state status of the children. Of course the children have resided in Utah
since December 2010, before the criminal case was commenced. Instead, father claims that
because the alteration or tennination of mother's parental rights is a possible component of
a sentence that may be imposed if mother is found to be criminally responsible for the crime
charged, that possibility qualifies the entire criminal proceeding (guilt phase and punishment
phase), regardless of what actually happens in the case, as a "child custody proceeding."
Appellee's brief at 39-42.
There are a myriad of reasons why the criminal case against mother cannot reasonably
be construed as a competing child custody proceeding. First, the court in the criminal case
only has jurisdiction over mother. The court does not have jurisdiction over father and
importantly it has no jurisdiction over the children. Because the court hearing the criminal
case does not have jurisdiction over both parents and the children, no comprehensive order
adjudicating the custody of the parties and the children in one forum (which is the intent of
the UCCJEA) can be put into place. All the criminal case can do is control the actions of
·mother with the children during the time the mother is subject to its jurisdiction.
Second, the fact that termination of parental rights is a potential sanction in a case
does not make the entire case a "child custody proceeding." The Act states:
(4)
"Child custody proceeding" means a proceeding in which
legal custody, physical custody, or parent-time with respect to a
child is an issue. The term includes a proceeding for divorce,
separation, neglect, abuse, dependency, guardianship, paternity,
16

termination of parental rights, and protection from domestic
violence, in which the issue may appear. ...
Utah Code§ 78B-13-102(4).
The criminal case is not centered on mother's termination of parental rights as are the
other types of proceedings detailed in the statute. The issues in the criminal case are
exclusively centered on whether mother violated the specific elements of the law under
which she was charged. That adjudication has nothing to do with the elements of a traditional
action to terminate parental rights. Only if mother is convicted of the crime charged and not
a lesser crime or degree thereof, does the issue of altering mother's parental rights even come
into play. Therefore, the criminal action only becomes a "child custody determination" if
mother is convicted of a crime that has, as a possible sentence, the alteration of her parental
rights. Unless or until there is a conviction of the requisite crime that allows alteration of her
parental rights, the proceeding is simply a criminal matter and not a child custody
proceeding.
Third, the facts surrounding the criminal prosecution reveal that mother is charged
only with unlawfully taking the parties' children out of Mexico. As detailed in the record,
the children are extraordinary individuals and have been nurtured and parented in an
impressive fashion by mother and their grandmother. Instead of proof that is typically seen
in a normal case that establishes conduct that harms the children, the evidence in this case,
as detailed in Judge Kimball's ruling in the Hague Convention case, demonstrates an
exceptional effort on mother's part to shoulder all the responsibilities with the raising of the
children. Appellant's opening brief, Addendum Exhibit A. Father, on the other hand, even
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after learning of their whereabouts has paid nothing for their support and maintenance either
to the mother or the children themselves. Rec. 458-470, 481-90. Accordingly mother does
not believe that any effort will be taken to alter her custodial rights or take the children out
of her case.
Fourth and most important, the criminal prosecution of Mother cannot be
characterized as a "simultaneous proceeding" under the UUCCJEA (Utah Code §
78B-13-206), because the criminal court did not acquire jurisdiction over all the parties and
children and because the criminal court's acquisition of jurisdiction over mother was not
based upon the home-state status of the children. Id.
Again, the decision inMeyeres v. Meyeres, 2008 UT App 364, 196 P.3d 604, could
not be clearer and the ruling more apposite to this case. Mother incorporates her analysis of
the Meyeres decision and the underlying statute set out in Point III above. Based upon the
law and facts laid out herein, the lower court's conclusion that the Mexico criminal case was
a "simultaneous [custody] proceeding" should be reversed.

V:

THE COURT FAILED TO CONDUCT THE NECESSARY
PROCEEDINGS TO EVALUATE WHETHER MOTHER HAD
ENGAGED IN UNJUSTIFIABLE CONDUCT THUS
ALLOWING UTAH TO DECLINE JURISDICTION.

The court made a finding that Mother had engaged in unjustifiable conduct and that
the misconduct justified Utah to decline jurisdiction. Appellant's opening brief, Findings of
Fact, ,r,r 32-33. The controlling statute is Utah Code§ 78B-13-208 (2008). In relevant part,
the statute states:
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Jurisdiction declined by reason of conduct. (1) Except as
otherwise provided in Section 78B-13-204 or by other law of
this state, if a court of this state has jurisdiction under this
chapter because a person invoking the jurisdiction has engaged
in unjustifiable conduct, the court shall decline to exercise its
jurisdiction unless: (a) the parents and all persons acting as
parents have acquiesced in the exercise of jurisdiction; (b) a
court of the state otherwise having jurisdiction under Sections
78B-13-201 through 78B-13-203 determines that this state is a
more appropriate forum under Section 78B-13-207; or (c) no
other state would have jurisdiction under Sections 78B-13-201
through 78B-13-203.
(2) If a court of this state declines to exercise its jurisdiction
pursuant to Subsection (1 ), it may fashion an appropriate remedy
to ensure the safety of the child and prevent a repetition of the
wrongful conduct, including staying the proceeding until a child
custody proceeding is commenced in a courthavingjurisdiction
under Sections 78B-13-201 through 78B-13-203.
Id.

Mother alleged in her verified petition the facts and circumstances that prompted and
justified her to move the children to Utah. Rec. 1,

,r,r

11, 12, 458-470, 481-90. Mother

contended in her opening brief that the finding of the court that mother had engaged in
unjustifiable conduct in moving the children was an abuse of discretion. Mother argued that
the court reached the conclusion without the benefit of a hearing or offering mother an
equivalent opportunity to present her evidence.

Mother argued that the review and

adjudication of disputed facts as part of a rule 12(b)( 1) motion to dismiss was improper and
an abuse of discretion. Appellant's opening brief at 41-43. In response, father argues that
the trial court did not actually weigh competing facts. Appellee' s brief at 45. Father contends
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that the court reviewed a number of undisputed court orders from Mexico as well as the
federal district court case. Id.
The argument of father is without merit. The briefs filed with this court establish that
the facts relating to mother's alleged misconduct are anything but "undisputed." Father and
mother's rendition of the facts relating to their relationship (the existence of emotional and
physical abuse), the conflicting findings of the two psychological reports conducted in
Mexico, the basis of the earlier orders in Mexico allowing father only supervised visitation
and other issues detailed in the parties respective statements of facts demonstrate that there
is very little agreement on the facts that are relevant to a finding of misconduct.
Accordingly, the conclusion that mother engaged in unjustifiable conduct must be
reversed because there is an abundance of evidence that mother acted appropriately. The
court's entry of an order dismissing the case on a rule 12(b)( 1) motion, where the material
facts are disputed, constitutes error.
Additionally, even if there was serious misconduct on the part of the Petitioner, the
exceptions contained in the statute would apply. As set out above, serious misconduct could
be a basis to decline jurisdiction "unless: ... (c) no other state would have jurisdiction under
Sections 78B-13-201 through 78B-13-203." Id. As argued above, there is no basis in the
UCCJEA for a finding that Mexico has jurisdiction in this matter. There was no prior
custody order that remained in effect that could be modified. There was no proceeding in
place when the Petition was filed. Crucially, Mexico is no longer the home state of the
children and has not held that designation since 2010, six years ago.
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The trial court's finding that Mother engaged in unjustifiable conduct was improper
on a motion to dismiss. The judgment of the trial court should be reversed.

VI:

THE LOWER COURT FAILED TO UNDERTAKE THE
STATUTORILY REQUIRED INVESTIGATION AS TO THE
EXISTENCE OF SIMULTANEOUS PROCEEDINGS.

In her opening brief, mother argued that lower court failed to take the steps set out in
the UCCJEA to investigate, on its own, the existence of"simultaneous proceedings" claimed
to exist by father. Appellant's opening brief at 30. See Utah Code § 78B-13-206(1).
Father argues first that mother did not raise the issue in the trial court. However,
father then acknowledges that mother in fact, raised the issued in her rule 52 and 59 motion
to amend judgment. Appellee's brief at 42; Appellant's opening brief at 1-2; R. 937,944.
The inclusion of the argument in the rules 52 and 59 motion adequately raised the
issue with the trial court. A trial court has the opportunity to rule if the following three
requirements are met: (1) "the issue must be raised in a timely fashion;" (2) "the issue must
be specifically raised;" and (3) a party must introduce "supporting evidence or relevant legal
authority." Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm 'n, 945 P.2d 125, 130 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)
(citations and internal quotations omitted). The mother's rule 52 and 59 motion raised the
issue explicitly and thereby satisfied the requirement of the case law. Appellant's opening
brief at 1-2; R. 937, 944.
On the merits, father's response establishes that, as mother contends, the trial court
did not undertake any statutorily allowed measured to determine the existence of a
simultaneous proceeding in Mexico and the failure to do so constituted an abuse of
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discretion. State v. Montiel, 2005 UT 48, ,-i 9, 122 P.3d 571, 575; Snow, Christensen &
Marteneau v. Lindberg, 2013 UT 15, ,-i 17, 299 P.3d 1058, 1064 (citation, brackets, and
internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly if this Court does not hold that there are not,
as mother contends, any simultaneous proceedings in Mexico at the time the petition was
filed, the matter should be remanded with directions that the trial court communicate with
the Mexico court in accordance with the statute.

VII:

THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY WEIGHED DISPUTED
FACTS IN GRANTING THE MOTION TO DISMISS.

Mother's opening brief demonstrated that the lower court did not reveal the decisional
method it used in finding the facts upon which the order dismissing the petition was based.
Appellant's opening brief at 32-3 7. Father does not contest the argument but instead asserts
that there are no disputed material facts in this case. Appellee's brief at 45-46.
Mother then contended that the actual findings, included in the lower court's orders,
are legally insufficient in that they were not specifically detailed and did not include enough
subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue
was reached. Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1021 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). Appellant's opening brief at 32-3 7. Father does not argue that the
findings were legally sufficient and detailed to disclose the steps utilized by the court to reach
its conclusions. Further father does not argue with the specific arguments made by mother
that the individual findings are internally inconsistent, contrary to the evidence and lacking
contrary to the applicable law.
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Father also does not contest mother's argument the Utah appellate courts have been
clear that in adjudicating a motion to dismiss based upon the lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, the court is to accept the factual allegations in the petition as true and to make
!

all reasonable inferences therefrom. Oakwood Vil/. LLC v. Albertson, Inc., 2004UT101, ,r,r
8-9, 104 P.3d 1226. Appellee's brief at 42-43. Further father does not contest that all of the
facts required to establishjurisdiction in Utah were included in the petition. Rec. 1, 8; 11, 17
and 53. Accordingly, mother respectfully asserts that the court should have denied the
motion to dismiss based upon the presumptions afforded the verified petition and the: failure
to do so constitutes reversible error.
I

Father has limited his argument on the issue to an analysis of Rule 12(b)(l)
adjudications on motions to dismiss. Father contends that the court may grant a mqtion to
dismiss even when the material facts upon which the motion is based are di~puted.
Appellee's brief at 42-43.
In determining the method a court should employ in resolving factual disputes
attendant to the adjudication of a motion to dismiss based upon lack of jurisdiction, mother
contends that the process set out for rule l 2(b )( 6) motions should be reviewed. This portion
of rule l 2(b) provides that if "matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded
by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as
provided in Rule 56 .... "
There is no question that rule 12(b)(1 ), which is the basis of father's motiori in this
case, does not provide a similar provision for the conversion to summary judgmertt when

23

outside material are relied upon by the court in its decision. This court has consistently
prohibited the weighing of evidence in adjudicating a motion to dismiss under Rule l 2(b )( 1).
To allow a court to enter findings on disputed material facts in the course of ruling on a
motion to dismiss would deny to the parties " ... an adequate opportunity to rebut materials
outside the pleadings." Spoons v. Lewis, 1999 Ut 82, 987 P.2d 36; see also Bekins Bar V

Ranch v. Utah Farm Prod. Cred Ass'n, 587 P.2d 151 (Utah 1978). The offering of
affirmative evidence does not automatically convert a rule 12(b)(1) motion in to one for
summary judgment, and "uncertainty as to the facts relevant to assessing the court's subject
matter jurisdiction will make it inappropriate to grant a motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(l) .

. . ." Mallory v. Brigham Young Univ., 2012 UT App 242, 285 P.3d 1230; rev. on other
grounds, Mallory v. Brigham Young Univ., 2014 UT 27, 332 P.3d 922.
Father takes issue with mother's summary of the holding in Spoons. Appellee's brief
at 42-43. Mother contends that she has accurately characterized the relevant findings of the
court in that decision. The point is that the Utah appellate courts have placed a general
prohibition against a court weighing evidence when considering motions to dismiss or for
summary judgment. The law is clear that the trial court cannot weigh contradictory evidence
or determine credibility when deciding whether dismissal or summary judgment is
appropriate. See IHC Health Servs., Inc. v. D & K Mgmt., 2008 UT 73, ,r 18, 196 P.3d 588.
It would be the a clear violation of that prohibition and a violation of basic due process for
the court to sanction the lower court's weighing of conflicting evidence in the course of an
adjudication of a motion to dismiss.
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Mother submits that all the findings and conclusions of the court relating to
jurisdiction must be rejected and reversed.

CONCLUSION
The order of the court dismissing this case based upon a lack of subject matter
jurisdiction should be reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings consistent
with the UUCCJEA.
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